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Jack Hirshleifer: A Nobel Prize left unbestowedKjell HauskenAbstractJack Hirshleifer (1925–2005) contributed to investment theory, information economics, 
conflict, and bioeconomics, clarified the foundations of investment and capital theory in the spirit 
of Fisher, and made basic contributions to the analysis of covariance risk, gambling and 
insurance, the Modigliani–Miller Theorem, and public investment through a focus on time, 
uncertainty and information. He formulated new models of public goods, added to understanding of 
contest success functions, and explained the paradox of power. He developed a general 
equilibrium approach to conflict jointly encompassing production, exchange, appropriation 
and defense. He analyzed the emotions as guarantors of threats and promises, proposed 
alternatives to the tit-for-tat strategy, considered the bioeconomic causes of war, and investigated 
the truthful signaling hypothesis. Jack Hirshleifer was a leading scholar and original thinker of 
the 20th century. His scientific contributions have left a Nobel Prize unbestowed.
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Beginning in 1950, Jack placed the theory of investment, interest, and capital on a firm
theoretical foundation. He was also a founding father of the information economics revolution. In
particular, he felt that investment theory was a confused mass of ill-defined concepts that were in
dire need of a clear integrative framework. He found the basis for that framework in the work of
Irving Fisher, and was thereby able to dispel controversies and distinguish lucidly between past
ideas that were sensible and those that were confusions.
From the late 1970s and thereafter, he was a leading economist contributing to our
understanding of phenomena that had been usually studied within disciplines such as political
science and biology. Jack was an economic theorist with broad-ranging interests. His fields of
specialization included investment and capital theory, information economics, applied theories of
the firm, uncertainty and information, price theory economics, political economy, the economic
theory of conflict, public goods, production, appropriation, combat, war, bioeconomics, biology,
evolutionary economics, evolutionary psychology, water supply and resource economics. During
the period 1950–2005 he authored 7 books, some 75 articles, and 7 book reviews.
Section 2 sets out Jack Hirshleifer's background and career. Section 3 discusses investment
theory and the information economics revolution. Section 4 proceeds with the expanding domain
of economics, conflict and sociobiology. Section 5 considers the provision of public goods.
Section 6 is on conflict and Section 7 on biology. Section 8 provides a concluding evaluation of
Jack Hirshleifer's scientific contributions.
2. Background and career
Jack Hirshleifer was born in Brooklyn, New York on August 26, 1925. His early childhood
involved intensive Jewish education. He was the only one in his family going to college. He
served in the U.S. Naval Reserve 1943–1945 and received all his degrees from the Harvard
economics department headed by the known anti-semite Harold H. Burbank. His 1950 Ph.D.
thesis was titled “Price Flexibility and General Independence”. Jack was a postdoctoral student in
Statistics and Economics at the University of Chicago 1951–1952, and worked at the RAND
Corporation in Santa Monica, California, between 1949 and 1955, where he retained a
consultancy position until the end of his life. The period up to 1955 witnessed much development
1. Introduction
Jack Hirshleifer1 was a political economist with multi-disciplinary interests. He had an
everlasting bright-eyed curiosity, an inquisitive mind, and humility combined with incisiveness
when he had reached his conclusions. He had a deep need to understand phenomena across
disciplines and expanded the neoclassical economic theoretical framework to analyze non-
traditional issues in remarkably new and innovative ways.1 Jack Hirshleifer was born in Brooklyn, NY on August 26, 1925. After serving on active duty in the U.S. Naval
Reserve in 1943–1945, he received an S.B. degree in 1945 and a Ph.D. in economics in 1950, both from Harvard
University. He was employed as an economist at the RAND Corporation from 1949 to 1955, taught at the University of
Chicago Graduate School of Business from 1955 to 1960, and thereafter at the Department of Economics at UCLA. He
was a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a Fellow of the Econometric Society. He served as
Vice-President of the American Economic Association and as President of the Western Economic Association, and as a
member of the Editorial Boards of the American Economic Review, the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,
and of the Journal of Bioeconomics. In 2000, he was elected a Distinguished Fellow of the American Economic
Association. He died in Los Angeles July 26, 2005 at 7:25 am, survived by his wife Phyllis (née Zimmerman; married,
1946), and their two sons, John (born 1954) and David (born 1958).
of game theory, mathematical economics, and experimental, evolutionary and behavioral
economics. Contributors proceeding beyond orthodox postulates were Shapley, Nash, Arrow,
Debreu, Flood, Dresher, and others. Jack absorbed these developments in his formative years and
saw their relevance for microeconomic theory and decision analysis with new significance for
information, uncertainty, and conflict in human interaction. He was at the University of Chicago
Graduate School of Business between 1955 and 1960, and then spent the rest of his life at UCLA.
At UCLA Jack joined Armen Alchian and Jacob Marschak, and subsequently John McCall, 
Robert Clower, Axel Leijonhufvud, Harold Demsetz, William Allen, Michael Intriligator, Lloyd 
Shapley, and others. One early contribution from this group was Alchian's (1950) article 
“Uncertainty, evolution, and economic theory”. Far removed from the centers of the US east 
coast, this core group of UCLA economists developed original cutting-edge research. Topics were 
the role of information, the place of institutions, the importance of evolutionary dynamics, the 
dynamics of conflict, the social and private underpinnings of insurance, and more generally 
analytical economics. Jack had a central role in many of these developments.
A typical starting point for Jack was to identify a phenomenon inside or outside economics that
he did not understand. He would then absorb the literature on the phenomenon, including claims
by many professing to have proved something about the phenomenon. As Jack worked
methodically through understanding the phenomenon, he would often realize that the claims were
unsubstantiated, which provoked and irritated him since in fact, in his view, the previous authors
had not proved anything at all! He was however far too polite to display his impatience, or to
waste time and effort on emotions, but he was motivated to ensure that he himself would truly
understand the phenomenon.
Jack worked with a key set of tools to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the world. He 
remained true to his home base in economics, while routinely venturing far abroad into other 
disciplines for inspiration. Examples of topics were mother–fetus conflict in the womb over 
resources and contests between the spermatozoa of different males within the uterus to be the first 
to fertilize the egg. Why not analyze these phenomena from a political economy point of view?
Jack's cross-disciplinary focus was observed by researchers in other disciplines. In his book 
Consilience, the biologist Wilson (1998: 222) identified Jack, along with Gary Becker, Thomas 
Schelling, Amartya Sen and George Stigler, as economists willing to trade with cognitive 
psychologists in an effort to “strengthen microeconomics.” The rationality paradigm and 
equilibrium analyses were crucial elements in Jack's endeavors. His skepticism, which the 
economics profession both appreciated and reinforced, and inclination to question commonly 
accepted propositions, prevented him from accepting many proposed answers that were part of a 
traditional comprehensive understanding of the world. The skepticism was a key motivator in the 
search for increased understanding.
My personal encounters with Jack Hirshleifer included participation in April 2003 in the 
Thursday lunch group that Jack helped found many years ago. Armen Alchian and Werner Hirsch 
would argue in a scholarly fashion. Earl Thompson would run an argument in search of an 
ideologically neutral explanation free of paradoxes. Harold Demsetz would sometimes argue 
forcefully for a position. Regardless of the flavor of the conversation, as Al Harberger has phrased 
it (in a personal letter), “Jack always managed, in one war or the other, to remain above the fray, 
but not as an aloof observer from afar. On the contrary, he was always engaged, always in the 
middle of the conversation, yet totally free of animosity or rancor, even at the purely intellectual 
level.” Hume (1740) suggested that “reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions.” 
Jack always managed to align his passion in the service of progressing economic analysis in a 
rational manner, never dictating what the end result of the analysis would be. One could have
intellectual disagreements with Jack, but the journey toward reaching agreement was always
enjoyable.
Many of Jack's best papers seem to have started with an insight. He would try to develop an
elegant model that would serve to further sharpen the insight, to ensure that its lesson would be
widely understood and appreciated. Jack had an ability to do great things with relatively simple
models. He had a love of building simple mathematical models and exploring their implications.
If a model became complex, he would work to simplify it. He would occasionally bemoan the
reliance on mathematical complexity at the expense of ingenuity. His articles are in general not
difficult to understand. If Jack perceived some subject matter to be complex, he would work to
make it more accessible. He could labor over a paragraph, tailor designing it for the specific target
audience. Jack often spent an enormous amount of time refining the text. His prose and writing
skill were beautiful. He also had an extraordinary ability to communicate ideas. In addition to
developing the argument thoroughly and diligently, he would design diagrams that he thought
would improve an article's comprehension. Telling use of numerical illustrations was a
considerable part of his impact. He also worked in historical examples in serious academic
articles. This makes his articles easier and more enjoyable to read, and the reader's understanding
is deepened. Jack thrived well within the neoclassical economics paradigm, and preferred to
analyze novel areas of economics using conventional tools rather than venturing outside the
paradigm.
Jack's early Jewish education and subsequent secular education, which involved evolutionary
theory, made him diplomatic, questioning, truth-seeking, and skeptical. He had a certain modesty
that can be advantageous when scrutinizing preconceived notions. He was humble, but not in the
sense of having a low opinion of his abilities. He was modest in never placing undue emphasis on
his own abilities or achievements at the expense of others or of the truth. He also had an unusual
readiness to admit mistakes, exceptional among academics. It requires confidence to admit
mistakes, and an absorption or at least considerable interest in the common good and advancing
science, while not being too preoccupied with one's own minute by minute status.
Many adjectives can be used to describe Jack: he was a gentle person, good-natured, patient,
warm, smiling, friendly, civilized, open-minded, humble, honorable, low-key, personal, tactful,
meticulous, intellectually curious, searching, patient, and virtuous. His quest for the truth and a
skeptical attitude made for attention for detail but he was free of arrogance, snobbishness or
pedantry. The UCLA graduate students called him “Happy Jack” because one never saw him
angry. Jack even had a dog named “Happy”. His office door was always open for all and sundry to
enter and interrupt. Reports from his earlier Ph.D. students suggest that, when he thought you
were wrong, you knew it, but never in ways that made you reluctant to continue the conversation.
He always wanted to learn more himself, and thought that the way to learn more was to facilitate
dialogue, even when much of the prior dialogue had not been all that useful.
He approached referee reports, which sometimes can be unclear and equivocal, in the same
manner, trying to fathom what a referee intended. In role of a coauthor, I often found myself lining
up all the interpretations for the various referee reports that I could think of, and then subsequently
adding the unlikely ones. Concluding that a referee had misunderstood, or was wrong, was only a
last resort. The response would then be to point out nicely and definitively the exact manner in
which the referee had misunderstood, and subsequently clarify how the point should be made to
be better understood.
He would scrutinize strategies to determine how they had survived evolutionarily, whether
they were beneficial or not for the individual and society, and which alternative strategies might
be more or less beneficial. As Martin McGuire has phrased it (in a personal letter), Jack revealed a
certain “exasperation with the endless refinement of some areas of economics (by assumption and
deduction compounded): “so boring” he would say—pronounced “booore ing.” “Why not do
something new like ‘conflict theory’?””
Jack was a political liberal in his high school days. During 1943–1945 he was on active duty at
the U.S. Naval Reserve. As a radar officer on a warship off the coast of Japan, he waited to see if
he was to be part of an attack on the mainland. Jack was spared that fight. Such experience may
suggest why on-going skirmishes within and outside academia were of interest to Jack mainly as
empirical data. There was likely no connection between his World War II experiences and his
conservative development, as for example was the case for Dostoyevsky, who was a radical until
before a firing squad for a second or two, and those instants of fear turned Dostoyevsky into an
arch conservative politically for the rest of his life. Jack's reading in economics and politics
brought about a gradual change in his thinking. Jack gradually concluded that socialism did not
work and caused incalculable human harm. He perceived socialism as an unsound economic
system, and also as a false religion. Jack returned to Judaism more and more in later years, and as
an economist was aware of the benefits of capitalism and the free market.
Many may have been puzzled by the apparent opposition or dissonance between Jack's
personal characteristics and his focus on conflict theory. Jack's personal characteristics were
perceived by many as inconsistent with a conflict-seeking attitude, so we might ask why Jack
spent half a life-time studying conflict. Any hypothesis is speculative, but why not, when
equipped with an insatiable hunger for increased insight, attempt to understand phenomena
associated with characteristics that Jack appeared not to possess. That would be a powerful signal
that you are not missing out on something in life that everyone else is engaged in. That is, you are
so engaged that you even research the topic scientifically! Since conflict, competition, and war
over scarce resources are so pervasive in life, why not make sure that you understand such
phenomena better than everyone else who is engaged in conflict on a daily basis? Such insight
may preempt conflict, enable spotting it before it emerges, and allow appropriate counter
measures to be devised. A plethora of advantages flow from understanding conflict.
One might interpret Jack Hirshleifer as being little prone to combat, but such an 
interpretation would miss the mark, or require an elaboration where combat is interpreted 
broadly. Jack chose the battles that he perceived as being worth fighting, and he fought 
according to his instinct and nature. If Jack did not accept your argument, his first instinct would 
be to attempt to understand the other point of view, being open to the possibility that his own 
point of view might be challenged, and he would seek some way to propel the discussion 
forward in a mutually beneficial and truth-seeking manner to gain new insight. He actively 
sought input from people whom he knew disagreed with him, and sought to accommodate 
alternative interpretations to the extent possible. It was almost impossible to have a sustained 
intellectual disagreement with Jack, given that both discussion partners preferred increased 
understanding, and if both had the patience to persevere. Temporary disagreement was possible, 
for example in the early phase of a research project or if the phenomenon was complex. 
Breaking the complexity down to smaller manageable units, it was often possible to pinpoint the 
source of disagreement. That might either cause agreement, or a subsequent reasoning process 
with a new pinpointing to locate the challenge. The end result would often be a path-breaking 
contribution, which was Jack's ultimate objective. That was Jack's combat, and he fought very 
well. Observe the relation to Tzu et al.'s (1963) suggestion of “subduing one's enemies without 
fighting”. Such a strategy is a more refined form of fighting, which requires far more skill. The 
ultimate result may be quite impressive. In this light, Jack was to the highest extent prone to 
combat. In fact, his entire life was combat and a struggle to increase his understanding of the
world. His desire to understand led him to combat, and struggle to understand combat and
struggle, a doubling up to achieve what one bargains for.
Jack Hirshleifer was politically conservative (right-of-center). He also participated in Torah
study groups where the text is essential. Jack was very good at interpreting text. His instinct was
to develop his views independently in a truth-seeking manner by relying on his powers of
reasoning, rather than going along with conventional wisdom. Jack perceived the liberal bias
within academia, especially in the 1960s and 1970s. The bias was of interest to him as empirical
data. Early in his career he had addressed the mainstream issues of economics. Having a deep
sense of connection to Jewish tradition, it was perhaps not important for him to be contained by
tradition in economics as well. His sound anchoring point enabled him to develop theoretical
heterodoxy by expanding the boundaries of economics. He envisioned that he might teach the
history of economic theory at the end of his career but never did teach that course.
Jack had an ethical or religious conception of God while at the same time agreeing with
Darwin that natural selection explains the origin of species, and possibly also the origin of life
itself. He perceived no inconsistency between Darwinism and a belief in God because in his view
God created the universe in the first place, which he did not believe took literally seven days, and
natural selection needs a universe to work on. In other words, rather than directly creating species,
God created a universe in which species were bound to develop.2
His strong sense of modesty and reserve, combined with his sense of discipline and
determination to proceed with his work, are rare and probably came from early and sustained
textual study and learning combined with exposure to Jewish texts. Jack knew how to be suaviter
in modo, fortiter in re, as expressed by the Jesuit General Claudio Aquaviva (1543–1615), which
can be translated from Latin as gentle in manner and resolute (forcible, strong) in deed. Similarly,
“speak softly and carry a big stick,” said Theodore Roosevelt. Jack's big stick was manifested in
his path-breaking contributions that clinched the argument at the end of the day. Jack seems to
have reasoned that self-promotion is inefficient because it interferes with study and learning. On
the one hand, that is a wonderful model. On the other hand, it is quite possible that Jack would
have earned even greater recognition if he had been at all interested in self-promotion. Cases
where Jack's contributions are present but not acknowledged may support this latter possibility.
As a leader Jack was leading without appearing to lead. He would take notes while others were
talking, would make a bold innovation, and would report back via email with an organized
coherent account of the discussion.
My own acquaintance with him reflects his intellectual curiosity. I recall walking across the 
University of Chicago Quads in 1992 when I was starting my dissertation.3 I had just read his 
1991 paper on the limits of reciprocity (Martinez-Coll and Hirshleifer, 1991). That paper is full of 
graphic illustrations about the strategies that can be expected to survive in the long run. With these 
graphics on my mind, I reflected during my walk on how Jack's results would differ if several2 Jack's views seem consistent with the scientific finding of a Big Bang 13.8 billion years ago, the emergence of the
Earth 4.55 billion years ago, transition from non-organic to organic chemistry at some point thereafter, the oldest
indication of life on earth in the form of a shale some 3.5 billion years ago, and the well established evolution of Homo
sapiens thereafter.
3 The aim of my dissertation was to design a new multilevel game theory allowing for arbitrarily many levels of 
organization, arbitrarily many actors at each level, translating strategies and payoffs across levels (see e.g. Hausken and 
Cressman, 2004; Hausken, 1998). In January 1995 I went to the Max Planck Institute in Cologne where director Fritz 
Scharpf had noted the lack of a two-level conception of game theory (Scharpf, 1991).
groups were set up in parallel with various kinds of competition between the groups. Although I
forwarded neither my dissertation nor my publications to Jack, he observed the publications in
print. We began communicating by e-mail in 1995, with Jack sending me complex equation
systems, which I solved usingMathematica. Our joint research gave rise to more complex models
than those that Jack usually preferred. Jack worked hard to simplify my complex suggestions to
ensure wide professional accessibility. In April 2003 I met Jack in person for the first time during
a 2-week visit to UCLA. Jack's office, which I used for part of the stay, was filled to the brim with
research material compiled over more than half a century of intellectual activity. It seems that Jack
had almost unbounded ideas for future research. In my own joint research with him, we designed
21 projects. I shall complete some of them, but not all. The remaining will forever circulate
through the back of my mind and influence my future research. Jack's last e-mail to me is dated
June 21, 2005, after which he was too weak due to advanced prostate cancer and chemotherapy. I
just had a look at that e-mail. 14 lines of clear reasoning, somewhat shorter and simpler sentences
than usual, but clear and lucid to the very last, and signed “Cordially”, as always. Jack died in Los
Angeles on July 26, 2005. I am greatly indebted for having had the opportunity to come so close
to Jack. I now turn to Jack's contributions.
3. Investment theory and the information economics revolution
Jack Hirshleifer clarified the foundations of investment and capital theory in the spirit of
Fisher, and made basic contributions to the analysis of covariance risk, gambling and insurance,
the Modigliani–Miller Theorem, and public investment, focusing on time, uncertainty and
information. Through examples and applications, he made the abstract ideas of contingent claims
concrete.
3.1. Investment and capital theory, and the economics of uncertainty
In the mid and late 1950s Jack published the exchange between quantity and quality 
(Hirshleifer, 1955a), on the economics of transfer pricing (Hirshleifer, 1955b), the economics of 
the divisionalized firm (Hirshleifer, 1957), peak loads and efficient pricing (Hirshleifer, 1958b), 
the sumptuary manifesto (Hirshleifer, 1959b), and a review of uncertainty and business decisions 
(Hirshleifer, 1956a). His 1958 JPE article (Hirshleifer, 1958a) was an early classic that analyzed 
different internal rates of return and present value rules when borrowing and lending rates 
diverge. He showed that, while the problem can be solved by considering the budget constraint, 
neither of these rules gives the correct answer all the time.
Jack early on established a reputation as a logical critic of the simplistic investment concepts in
public finance. He criticized excessive confidence in the efficacy of government spending
projects, such as California's Feather River project. He helped disparage naive arguments in favor
of massive government projects that were prominent in the 1950s and 1960s.
Although a theorist, Jack certainly had an appreciation for practical applications. In his 
coauthored 1960 book (DeHaven et al., 1960; see also Hirshleifer, 1960 and DeHaven and 
Hirshleifer, 1957), alternative methods of supplying water to southern California were put to 
cost–benefit analysis. A 1967 AER article (Hirshleifer and Milliman, 1967) reviewed what 
actually happened: Policy makers ignored the advice, and chose what both prospectively and 
retrospectively was the worst economic choice. They concluded: “It appears that the agenda for 
economists, at this point, should place lower priority upon the further refinement of advice for 
those efficient and selfless administrators who may exist in never-never land. Rather, it should
focus on devising institutions whereby fallible and imperfect administrators may be forced to
learn from error.”
His 1961 AER paper (Hirshleifer, 1961b) discussed how covariance of new risks with the 
existing portfolio makes it desirable to diversify by adding new risks, and he provided an 
exposition of the Bayesian approach to statistical decision (Hirshleifer, 1961a). He thereafter 
analyzed the equilibrium of the firm (Hirshleifer, 1962b), the firm's cost function (Hirshleifer, 
1962c), efficient allocation of capital in an uncertain world (Hirshleifer, 1964a), and internal 
pricing and decentralized decisions (Hirshleifer, 1964b).
Thereafter, his 1965 and 1966 QJE articles, Hirshleifer (1965, 1966) developed the time-
state-preference approach, today referred to as the state-contingent model, applied to 
traditional problems in economics such as gambling and insurance, the Modigliani–Miller 
Theorem, and evaluation of public projects. In 1967 Jack published a crucial note on the 
Bohm-Bawerk/Wicksell theory of interest (Hirshleifer, 1967). Jack's contributions on 
neoclassical capital theory established him as a pioneer of the role of time, uncertainty and 
information (Hirshleifer, 1989c) i n  Fisher's (1907, 1930) spirit. Thereafter came a brief 
article on the investment decision (Hirshleifer, 1968a), an article on preferences and time 
(Hirshleifer, 1968b), and a treatment of risk and uncertainty (Hirshleifer and Shapiro, 1969).
Jack's 1970 book Investment, Interest and Capital (Hirshleifer, 1970), together with 
Patinkin's (1965) Money, Interest and Prices, became essential textbooks for graduate 
students, especially for those working in the then-young field of financial economics. Whereas 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) deserve recognition for their foundational work on debt and 
dividend policy, Jack deserves recognition for carefully laying out the details of the Fisherian 
paradigm in a way that provides the broad foundation for modern corporate finance theory. He 
resurrected, established, and further developed Fisherian general equilibrium analysis as the 
foundation upon which intertemporal economic theory and modern corporate finance theory 
are founded, at a time when the partial equilibrium framework was common. Jack's early 
critique of mainstream macroeconomics, as reflected in his 1970 book, is that it neglected the 
importance of expectations. He provided early examples of the effects of expectations on 
monetary and macroeconomic outcomes. A greater emphasis on expectations eventually was 
the underpinning of the rational expectation revolution in macroeconomics, as well as more 
recent developments that allow for imperfect rationality of expectations. In today's analyses of 
stock markets and other markets, expectations play a crucial role. Jack thereafter published 
what he labeled the missing chapter of exchange theory (Hirshleifer, 1973b), ‘sustained yield' 
versus capital theory (Hirshleifer, 1989b), and he published investment decision criteria in The 
New Palgrave (Hirshleifer, 1987d, 1993b,c). A subsequent contribution in his 1975 QJE paper 
(Hirshleifer, 1975) was that differences in tastes are not enough to explain speculation. 
Differences in beliefs are also required. In contrast to earlier work on speculation that ignored 
the endogeneity of prices, Jack was the first scholar to analyze speculation in a full general 
equilibrium model, carefully accounting for different structures of market completeness. He 
showed that market incompleteness alone cannot explain speculation. His article is the first to 
point out the indeterminacy of equilibrium when markets are incomplete. He proceeded with a 
theory of speculation under alternative regimes of markets (Hirshleifer, 1977b, see also 
Hirshleifer and Rubinstein, 1975).
Building on the distinction between price risk versus quantity risk in speculative markets, 
David Hirshleifer (1988) analyzed risk, futures pricing, and the organization of production in 
commodity markets. Building directly on the same modeling approach, David Hirshleifer (1990) 
considered hedging pressure and futures price movements in a general equilibrium model.
Within capital theory Jack's main concern was to place the theory of investment, interest, and 
capital into an integrated and consistent logical framework that could incorporate the notions of 
optimization, equilibrium, prices, decisions over time, under uncertainty, and taking into account 
differences in information. He emphasized the term structure of interest rates. He thus thought that 
the emphasis on the rate of interest in the controversy involving ‘reswitching’ and ‘truncation’ 
theorems in capital theory was misplaced. Velupillai (2005) proposed that “the evolution of 
economic theory have vindicated Hirshleifer's Fisherian stance on this, as on many other matters 
of capital theory.”
3.2. The information economics revolution
Jack's essential contribution about the private and social value of information was his 1971 
AER article (Hirshleifer, 1971). He showed that the value placed on information by participants in 
competitive markets need not correspond to its social value. Public information may have zero or 
negative social value. The reason is that premature revelation of public information may remove 
the possibility for agents in the private sector to balance their portfolios in order to spread their 
individual risks. Considering an infinitesimal deviant individual in a representative individual 
world, he showed that the benefit of receiving information first bears no necessary relationship to 
the social value of the information. Inventive activity can be oversupplied, which he illustrated 
with an inventor who can make investments, and thus speculate on securities markets, based upon 
knowledge of the invention. The first reason is the “commons effect” where undiscovered 
knowledge is a common-property resource, entry into which tends to continue as long as the 
average yield (not the marginal yield, as efficiency dictates) is remunerative. The second reason is 
the “speculative effect”. Even if the information has no social value, it may have private value by 
transferring wealth from uninformed to informed traders. Similarly, information about the future 
aggregate supply of resources in the economy is privately valuable to consumers since it allows 
informed consumers to profit at the expense of the uninformed. Furthermore, if information 
cannot affect aggregate production decisions, then it is also not socially valuable since what one 
consumer gains another loses. Such “races to be first” to invent or invest play a role in the 
literature on patent races, which is a challenge within intellectual property law that the profession 
still works to understand. Consequently, too much information, revealed without accounting for 
optimal timing, may reduce welfare. In contrast, without property rights for inventions, or for 
information already produced, we have a “public good effect” inducing underinvestment and free 
riding. He also published an article on liquidity, uncertainty, and the accumulation of information 
(Hirshleifer, 1972), a follow-up AER article about where we are in the theory of information 
(Hirshleifer, 1973a), an article on the origin, function, and future of privacy (Hirshleifer, 1980a), 
and he took time to review Schelling's (1978) Micromotives and Macrobehavior (Hirshleifer, 
1980b).
After a 1975 JEL expository survey with John G. Riley on “The analytics of uncertainty and 
information” (Hirshleifer and Riley, 1975), the book with the same title appeared in 1992 
(Hirshleifer and Riley, 1992). Recent intellectual advances were presented, unifying important but 
previously partial results into a single picture. The economics of uncertainty and information was 
shown to generalize and extend standard economic analysis. First focusing on the economics of 
uncertainty, the state of knowledge is fixed and each person adapts by making an optimal choice 
among the immediate “terminal” actions available. These choices determine the overall market 
equilibrium, which reflects the social distribution of risk-bearing. Secondly focusing on the 
economics of information, the state of knowledge is no longer held fixed, and individuals can
overcome their ignorance by “informational” actions. Examples of applications are analyzing
stock market returns, evaluating accident prevention measures, and assessing patent and
copyright laws. Examples of topics are insurance, the Capital Asset Pricing Model, auctions,
deterrence of entry, and research and invention. As of July 2005, the book had been sold in over
10,000 paperback and 750 hardcover copies, making it the best selling Cambridge Survey in
Economic Literature for the 1990s and beyond.
3.3. Microeconomic theory
Jack's successful Price Theory and Applications text was first published in 1976 (Hirshleifer, 
1976), emphasizing individual rationality. The book has been translated into Japanese and 
Spanish, and has been and will be essential for many generations of undergraduate students. The 
reason the book was so successful was that it was the first textbook to systematically integrate 
advanced microeconomic theory with real world applications of the theory. Subsequently this has 
become the industry standard for price theory texts, several of which, in the highest form of 
flattery, have even borrowed the precise words of his title! The 7th and latest edition appeared in 
2005, coauthored with David Hirshleifer and Amihai Glazer. The book can be expected to play a 
key role for many years to come.4
4. The expanding domain of economics, to conflict and sociobiology
Jack's interests expanded simultaneously in many different directions. One can observe life-
long interests expressed in a preference for general equilibrium analysis applied to ever-new 
phenomena. Seeds from early in his career developed and matured in later years, always being 
true to economic reasoning. One example was his work on war damages (Hirshleifer, 1953a,b). 
Over the subsequent 25years, he wrote on the social structure after a bombing disaster 
(Hirshleifer, 1956b), capitalist ethics—tough or soft (Hirshleifer, 1959a), on the civil defense 
debate (Hirshleifer, 1962a), and on economic recovery (Hirshleifer, 1969). Then came two 
breakthrough articles along these lines, first, economics from a biological viewpoint (Hirshleifer, 
1977a), and second, the AER paper on competition, cooperation, and conflict in economics and 
biology (Hirshleifer, 1978a). These two articles drew connections between economics, biology, 
and conflict, and marked the beginning of Jack's joint and intertwined focus on sociobiology and 
conflict, which he pursued while developing his insights within information economics.
After a few intermediate articles, the pathbreaking AER article on the expanding domain of 
economics (Hirshleifer, 1985) appeared 7years later. This article is a broad overview of the4 Senior Editor Scott Parris reports on first meeting Jack “in February 1992, and he welcomed a still green economics 
editor on a campus visit from Cambridge University Press with genuine warmth and encouragement. That kind of 
introduction made it an enormous professional and personal pleasure to promote his long awaited work The Analytics of 
Uncertainty and Information with John Riley from that year onwards… It has been no less a pleasure to have sponsored 
Jack's collected essays in “The Dark Side of the Force.” The Press also owes Jack a great deal for so commandingly 
supporting Cambridge's efforts to defend publishing Lomborg's (2001) ‘The Skeptical Environmentalist’ in the face of 
some of the most scathing criticism the Press has ever received. It helped to have an ally like Jack, who was second to no 
one in the pursuit of open inquiry and freedom of expression… In 13years of visiting him at UCLA and in now countless 
e-mail messages Jack was forthright, incisive, inventive, and cordial, even when he was inspiring appropriate chagrin on 
my part for not following through promptly enough on some aspect of one of his projects. He was a straight shooter on 
any topic you discussed with him and unabashed about pointing out contradictions in arguments or weak assumptions. 
The upshot of this was to make you rethink first (and second and third) principles with vigor and insight, two hallmarks 
of Jack's thinking.”
application of economic logic to a variety of “non-economic” problems. Jack was a leader in 
extending economic methods to problems more traditionally studied in a variety of other 
disciplines. Jack began by examining the endogeneity of preferences. He identified the difference 
between altruistic preferences, and what would now be called the “warm-glow” effect of 
participation. He reviewed Becker's (1976) “rotten kid” theorem, which says that an altruistic 
parent can gain from altruism. As an alternative theory of preferences, models of status such as the 
rat-race were examined. The underlying point of view is that of “as-if” rationality—altruism must 
provide some benefit to the altruist. From this perspective, Jack examined the psychological 
model of “anger, gratitude, response” and proposed that seemingly irrational behavior does 
indeed benefit the individual. The final topic was once again that of conflict. A narrow range of 
possible settlements, it was argued, increases the potential for conflict. Increasing returns 
followed by diminishing returns explain the monopoly on military force within the state, while 
also explaining the multiplicity of states.5
5. The provision of public goods: weakest link versus best shot
Jack was also interested in the nature of public goods. He observed that it was traditionally
assumed in Samuelson's specification of public goods that the socially available amount X of a
public good is the simple sum of the separate amounts xi provided by i=1,…,I persons, i.e.
X ¼Pi xi. Rather than generating a new incremental contribution with this same assumption,
Jack again proposed something new and extraordinary. The social composition could be
X ¼ miniðxiÞ, which means weakest-link, or X ¼ maxiðxiÞ, which means best-shot (Hirshleifer, 
1983, 1985). He exemplified weakest-link with flood protection as a public good (Hirshleifer, 
1983: 371):5 Jac
as in th“Anarchia is a perfectly circular island, and each citizen owns a wedge-shaped slice (not
all equal) from the center to the sea. Like the Netherlands, Anarchia is protected by dikes
from occasional storms that threaten to flood the land. But since Anarchia has no
government, everyone makes his own decision as to how high a dike to build. While the
height of each citizen's dike is perfectly visible to all, the customs of Anarchia forbid
enforcement of any threat, inducement, or contract whereby some parties might influence
the choice of others. In times of flood the sea will penetrate the sector belonging to
whichever citizen has constructed the lowest dike, but the topography of Anarchia is such
that no matter where the sea enters, damage will be suffered equally over the whole island.
The economists of Anarchia have long realized that flood-protection for their island is a
public good.“ Each citizen is responsible for one dike, and the effectiveness of each dike is
based on its height at the lowest point (which is zero if no dike has been built there)”.Best-shot public goods were exemplified by missile defense protection (Hirshleifer, 1983: 
373):“Imagine a number of anti-missile batteries ringing a city, firing at a single incoming
nuclear-armed ICBM, where destruction for all will be the consequence if the enemy
device gets through the defensive ring. Then, for all practical purposes, the only relevant
question is whether the single best defensive shot is good enough to destroy the incomingk's expansive views on economic ideas in the social sciences were also an intellectual inheritance to his son David, 
e paper on fads, fashion, custom, and cultural change as informational cascades (Bikhchandani et al., 1992).
bogey. Or a logically similar situation: the supporters of two claimants to the throne might
engage in battle, with all the combatants on each side instructed to aim exclusively to kill
the rival pretender.”The weakest-link arises where each individual has a veto on the total to be provided. The 
best-shot arises when there is a single prize and any individual's effort can secure the prize. 
Compared with the conventional summation formula, Jack observed that underprovision of the 
public good tends to be moderated when the weakest-link case applies, and aggravated when 
the best-shot case applies. Having worked on disasters, Jack realized where the survival of the 
community may depend on each person doing his or her duty, and the weakest-link case may 
therefore apply. Disaster conditions tend to elicit unselfish behavior. Harrison and Hirshleifer 
(1989) found strong empirical support for the theoretical anticipations for all three formulas 
using a sequential protocol. Even under the more onerous sealed-bid (simultaneous play) 
protocol, the subjects made partial progress toward the theoretical ideal. Subsequent research 
applying the weakest-link and best-shot formulations includes Bliss and Nalebuff (1984), and 
Anderlini and Felli (2006) who apply the formulations to analyze transaction costs and the 
robustness of the Coase theorem.
Conybeare et al. (1994) devised an empirical test procedure applied to the Warsaw Pact (1963–
1987), NATO (1961–1987), the Triple Alliance (1880–1914, best-shot defense public good 
provided by Germany), and the Triple Entente (1880–1914, Britain as weakest-link). Jack's 
innovative public good concepts have been applied in policy contexts (Sandler, 1997; Arce M. 
and Sandler, 2001): weakest-link and best shot are very much on the mind of policy makers 
concerned with health issues, cyber space virus control, atmospheric monitoring, deforestation, 
disease control, peacekeeping, pollution, and more. In Hausken (2002), I merged game theory and 
reliability theory to show that the weakest-link rule applies for a series system, while the best-shot 
rule applies for a parallel system: specific games are associated with each of these systems. Van 
Huyck et al. (1991) and Weber et al. (2004) consider ‘weak-link’ coordination games where 
strategies are numbered from 1 and upwards. The row player's payoff depends on the number he 
or she chooses and on the smallest number chosen by any other player. The payoffs are an 
increasing function of the smallest number chosen, and a decreasing function of how far the row 
player is from the smallest number. Weber et al.'s (2004) examples “include keeping a secret, 
meeting a group at a restaurant that will not seat anyone until everyone in the group has arrived, 
output in “high reliability” organizations in which a single failure or low-quality component 
causes disaster, or submitting chapters to a book that cannot be printed until all the chapters 
arrive.” In his 1987 book (Hirshleifer, 1987c), Economic Behavior in Adversity, Jack reprinted 10 
of his articles on disaster, recovery, cooperation, and conflict, adding a brief background for each 
chapter, an introduction, and indices. Jack's identification of public goods that go beyond and 
differ from the standard Samuelson (1954) rendition has become part of textbook expositions 
(Hillman, 2003).6. Conflict
6.1. Ratio versus difference rent-seeking functions
Jack's interest in conflict led him into the rent-seeking literature. Tullock (1967) had observed 
the losses from resources used to influence government to make personally favorable policy 
decisions. Tullock (1980) subsequently proposed a rent-seeking model based on a probabilistic
contest success function. Other contest-success functions are possible.6 Jack generalized the 
conception of a contest success function and looked at the properties of ratio and difference 
models of relative success (Hirshleifer, 1989a).7 He observed in particular that the Tullock (1980) 
contest-success function had the limitation that neither one-sided submission nor two-sided peace 
between the parties could occur as a Cournot–Nash equilibrium. He found a formula that enabled 
both these two possibilities to arise, as is consistent with military experience. In the difference 
formula, each party's success is a function of the difference between the parties' resource 
commitments to the contest. The contest success function for the difference form is a logistic 
curve with increasing returns up to an inflection point at equal resource commitments.8
6.2. A general equilibrium approach to production and conflict
Jack observed that rent-seeking competition falls within a broader category of conflict 
interactions that also include military combats, election campaigns, industrial struggles (strikes 
and lockouts), legal conflicts (lawsuits), rivalries among siblings or between spouses within the 
family, etc. He further reasoned (Hirshleifer, 1989a: 101–102) that8 De
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propert“Owing perhaps to failure to perceive these wider implications, the papers in the rent-
seeking literature generally do not adopt a general-equilibrium approach which would
make explicit provision for the alternative productive or consumptive uses of resources
employed in rent-seeking competitions. Also, what is very important, a general
equilibrium model would typically make the value of the prize an endogenous variable
rather than an exogenously given parameter.”Jack maintained this general equilibrium attitude toward conflict for the remainder of his 
career, and wrote a number of papers. After the economic approach to conflict (Hirshleifer, 1987a,
b) and conflict and settlement (Hirshleifer, 1987a) came his analytics of continuing conflict (J.
Hirshleifer, 1988). Rather than considering a radical disjunction between war and peace, or 
between conflict and settlement, Jack argued that contending parties will typically be 
simultaneously at war and peace. That is, the intensity of conflict among the parties can vary 
along a spectrum. Absolute peace and absolute war are extremes of the spectrum that will rarely if 
ever be attained. He first pointed out that rational and self-interested individuals, groups, or 
nations balance on the margin between two alternative ways of generating income. The first is 
“peaceful” production and exchange. The second is “appropriative” efforts designed to seize 
resources previously controlled by others (or to defend against such invasions). Both production 
and appropriation are normal lines of activity to the extent that doing so seems profitable. 
Applying a resource partition function, a social production function, a combat power function, 
and an income distribution equation, Jack showed that, in contrast with the harmonistic bias of 
orthodox economic theory, a general equilibrium model can also encompass the hostile and 
destructive interactions that characterize real-world social relations. The solutions were obtainedvelopments in conflict theory include Müller and Wärneryd (2001) and Garfinkel (2004) who showed how agents
evote separate fighting efforts at two levels of organization. In Hausken (2005) I compare rent-seeking models
roduction and conflict models at the individual and group levels.
lman and Samet (1987) considered rent seeking when the higher outlay wins with certainty, that is, where the
success function has the characteristics of an “all-pay auction”.
perdas (1996) axiomatized the two forms, showing that these are the only forms satisfying a set of plausible
ies, with an independence from irrelevant alternative property as the key axiom.
under the symmetrical Cournot protocol, the familiar Stackelberg condition, and a novel
hierarchical protocol called Threat-and-Promise.
Having established his basic framework for analysis of conflict, Jack proceeded in his 1991 
AER paper (Hirshleifer, 1991b) to show that peace is more likely to the extent that the 
decisiveness of conflict is low, the stakes are small, or the technology favors defense. He also 
showed that increased productive complementarity between the parties does not systematically 
favor peace. That is, the poorer side is generally motivated to invest more heavily in fighting. This 
can make conflict an income-equalizing process.
6.3. The paradox of power
Elaborating upon the above insight, Jack investigated the paradox of power (Hirshleifer, 
1991a), which he considered a very essential contribution, and which, among other things, 
explains political redistributions of income from the rich to the poor. On the one hand, in 
power struggles, the strong often grow stronger and the weak weaker. Powerful nations and 
tribes have often subjugated weaker neighbors. For example, the Jews of Europe, weaker in 
political and military terms, were repeatedly despoiled of their wealth. However, the weak can 
also sometimes prevail. First, in wars, smaller or poorer nations have often fought larger 
adversaries to a standstill, as in the Vietnam War. Second, historically, from the earliest times, 
poor nomadic tribes have successfully preyed on more affluent cities and empires. Third, in 
modern redistributive struggles, we almost always observe income transfers from upper to 
lower fractiles of the wealth distribution. Fourth, although in rich societies farmers have 
decreased in numbers and voting strength, they have gained increasing subsidies and benefits. 
Having mentioned the Jews, Jack might have mentioned that the Jewish experience may have 
motivated Jews to work harder in many ways, as evidenced by the presence of Jews within 
politics, commerce, and academia. Jack's explanation is that initially poorer contenders are 
rationally motivated to fight harder, to invest relatively more in conflictual activity. 
Consequently, poorer or smaller combatants frequently end up improving their position 
relative to richer or larger ones.
Jack distinguished between the strong and weak forms of the paradox of power. The strong 
form is such that, in mixed conflict–cooperation interactions, the contending parties will end up 
with exactly identical incomes regardless of the initial resource distribution. The weak form is 
such that the final distribution of income will have smaller dispersion than the initial distribution 
of resources. That is, if R1/R2 is the initial ratio of resources, where #1 is the better-endowed side, 
and I1/I2 is the final ratio of income, then R1/R2 > I1/I2 > 1. Jack found that only when the 
decisiveness of conflict is sufficiently high does the richer side gain relatively in terms of 
achieved income. Just as for his weakest-link and best-shot contribution, for the paradox of power 
Jack also joined coauthors and tested his theory experimentally. Durham et al. (1998) found broad 
support for the theory.
6.4. Equilibrium strategies do indeed depend on incentives
Jack observed a rather startling claim in various major political science journals that a 
change in penalties may have no effect upon criminals' decisions, or, more generally, that 
altering incentives may not affect behavior. There are certainly games where payoffs can be 
altered without altering equilibria, and thus not altering behavior. Also, Schelling (1960) has 
shown how limiting one's options (such as burning one's bridges in war) can be
advantageous. Hirshleifer and Rasmusen (1992) pinpoint where the argument goes astray, 
and illustrate how game theory is properly applied to social policy choices. The initial 
observation is that in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, changing one player's payoffs 
affects only the other player's equilibrium strategy mix. This causes what can be called a 
Payoff Irrelevance Proposition (PIP). The issue is then how general this proposition is. They 
show, first, that the proposition does not hold in a sequential-move game where the policy-
maker moves first. Second, in a simultaneous-move game, the proposition holds only when 
the policy space is discrete, and for sufficiently small payoff revisions that do not change 
the strategy elements entering into equilibrium. If choices are sufficiently lumpy, the 
proposition may apply over a certain range. Consequently, the proposition only rarely applies 
in actual policy making situations. Incentives almost always affect behavior in equilibrium. 
That is, as the payoffs change, a new equilibrium usually emerges, which makes it 
individually rational for each player to alter his or her strategy in accordance with the new 
equilibrium.
6.5. Jack's Presidential Address: the dark side of the force
Jack was elected Vice President of the Western Economic Association in 1990, became 
President-Elect in 1991, and was President from July 1, 1992 to June 30, 1993. The 
description above indicates what was foremost on Jack's mind at that time, and so his 
Presidential Address June 22, 1993 came as no surprise. It was titled “Cooperation, Conflict, 
and All That,” and was published in a slightly expanded version in Economic Inquiry under 
the title “The dark side of the force” (Hirshleifer, 1994). This is probably the most entertaining 
of Jack's publications. I was not present at the Address, but, loaded with catchy formulations 
and tantalizing crowd pleasers, the 10-page article without equations is written to make one 
almost feel enjoyably present during the speech. No one ever doubted Jack's ability to 
expound economic theory, which he supplemented with examples, diagrams, and rich verbal 
formulations. To illustrate that Jack's talents extended far beyond those of a theoretical 
economist, we can look at how he went about delivering a speech to listeners who want 
substance, but in a setting where the most dry, theoretical, abstract, and dull approaches are 
not necessarily the best vehicles of communication.
Jack started with Edmund Burke's accusation that “the age of chivalry is gone. That of
sophisters, economists, and calculators, has succeeded: and the glory of Europe is extinguished
forever.” He observed that “200years later, it seems we economists and sophisters have still not
managed to extirpate chivalry and generosity.” For example, people contribute to charities and
public goods, and cooperate in the Prisoner's Dilemma. After observing Adam Smith's argument
for self-interest and division of labor, he proceeded with the more extreme Hayek argument that
“only when people learned to be selfish, learned to overcome their innate instincts toward
communal sharing, did it become possible to make the transition from primitive society to free
civilized life.” After this introduction, Jack laid out his main argument:“Our profession has on the whole taken not too harsh but rather too benign a view of the
human enterprise. Recognizing the force of self-interest, the mainline Marshallian tradition
has nevertheless almost entirely overlooked what I will call the dark side of the force—to
wit, crime, war, and politics. That's like telling the story of Luke Skywalker and Obe Wan
Ben Kenobe without mentioning Darth Vader in Star Wars. “Crime,” “war,” “politics”—
the words do not even appear in the index to Marshall's Principles of Economics.”
Jack thereafter presented Marshall's (1920) “characteristically flat and prosaic” definition of 
economics as the “study of mankind in the ordinary business of life; it examines that part of 
individual and social action which is most closely connected with the attainment and with the use 
of the material requisites of well-being.” Jack interpreted the definition as follows:“So, for Marshall, economics is bean-counting. Boring, boring, boring. The title page of
the Principles carries the famous epigraph: “Natura non facit saltum”—Nature doesn't
make leaps. What Marshall really meant was: “No excitement please, we're English
here.””Observing Pareto's division of the efforts of men into production and appropriation, Jack
proceeded as follows:“Pareto is saying, sure, you can produce goods for the purpose of mutually beneficial
exchange with other parties—OK, that's Marshall's “ordinary business.” But there's
another way to get rich: you can grab goods that someone else has produced.
Appropriating, grabbing, confiscating what you want–and, on the flip side, defending,
protecting, sequestering what you already have–that's economic activity too. Take
television. Cops chase robbers, victims are stalked by hitmen (or should I say hitpersons?),
posses cut off rustlers at the pass, plaintiffs sue defendants, exorcists cast spells against
vampires. What is all this but muscular economics? Robbers, rustlers, hitpersons, litigants
—they're all trying to make a living. Even vampires are making economic choices:
sucking blood is presumably the cost-effective way of meeting their unusual nutritional
needs.”In contrast to Marx's interpretation of conflict as class struggle, Jack pointed out “that in-group
amity rises and falls in proportion to external menace, and vice versa.” Jack was inclined to take
such a view based on his insight in war theory, human history, primate history involving
phenomena such as hunting in packs, principles such as competitive exclusion in population
biology, and evolutionary biology more generally. Observing Machiavelli's argument that “it is
impossible that good soldiers should not be able to procure gold,” Jack then observed:“This is Machiavelli's version of the golden rule: he who gets to rule, will get the gold.
Human history is a record of the tension between the way of Niccolo Machiavelli and what
might be called the way of Ronald Coase. According to Coase's Theorem, people will
never pass up an opportunity to cooperate by means of mutually advantageous exchange.
What might be called Machiavelli's Theorem states that no one will ever pass up an
opportunity to gain a one-sided advantage by exploiting another party. Machiavelli's
Theorem standing alone is only a partial truth, but so is Coase's Theorem standing alone.
Our textbooks need to deal with both modes of economic activity. They should be saying
that decision-makers will strike an optimal balance between the way of Coase and the way
of Machiavelli—between the way of production combined with mutually advantageous
exchange, and the dark-side way of confiscation, exploitation, and conflict.”Observing that “rent-seeking, in its usual connotation of maneuvering for licenses and
monopoly privileges, is to conflict as milkwater is to blood, sweat, and tears,” and that researchers
in other disciplines do good work when they in fact do economics, Jack offered two propositions.
First, “cooperation, with a few obvious exceptions, occurs only in the shadow of conflict.”
Second, “when people cooperate, it is generally a conspiracy for aggression against others (or, at
least, is a response to such aggression).” He justified these by quoting Clausewitz, Adam Smith,
and Freud. Clausewitz argued that “for achieving the political aims that are the end of war, the
decision by arms is what cash settlement is in trade.” That is, “trade can be conducted without
cash settlement, but the ability to make cash settlement ultimately constrains what trades a
merchant can engage in.” Similarly, “a state remains influential in peacetime only owing to the
damage it could inflict in the event of war.” Further, Adam Smith observed that an industrious and
wealthy nation is most likely to be attacked, and Freud argued that “it is always possible to bind
together a considerable number of people… so long as there are other people left over to receive
the manifestations of their aggressiveness.” Consequently, “the bottom line is that nations with
wealth-enhancing laws and institutions will not be able to enjoy the fruits thereof unless, when
challenged, they can put up a tough fight. And the same holds for political parties, clubs, families,
and business firms.”
After dividing the sources of conflict into opportunities, preferences, and perceptions, Jack
proceeded with material from his other papers on the technology of conflict, the modeling of
conflict interactions, and the consequences of conflict, and concluded his address as follows:9 In
raised.
distribu“Thus, in recognizing the role of conflict we must not go overboard in the other direction.
All aspects of human life are responses not to conflict alone, but to the interaction of the
two great life-strategy options: on the one hand production and exchange, on the other
hand appropriation and defense against appropriation. Economics has done a great job in
dealing with the way of Ronald Coase; what we need now is an equally subtle and
structured analysis of the dark side: the way of Niccolo Machiavelli.”6.6. Jack's final contributions on conflict
After his presidential period Jack published his paper on Anarchy and its breakdown 
(Hirshleifer, 1995a). He defined anarchy as a non-chaotic spontaneous order in which participants 
can seize and defend resources without regulation from above. Each contestant balances between 
productive exploitation of the current resource base and fighting to acquire or defend resources. 
As an advance from his earlier models where the resource R for each contender equaled 
production E plus fighting F, R = E + F, now he defined R = aE + bF, where a and b are unit costs of 
transforming resources into production or fighting, respectively. Jack found that anarchy is 
sustainable only when the “decisiveness parameter” is sufficiently low (less than one), which 
means that there are strongly diminishing returns to fighting effort, and when incomes exceed the 
viability minimum.9 When the decisiveness is larger than one, anarchy becomes dynamically 
unstable, leading to dictatorship by the strongest. With increased population, fighting becomes 
rampant and per capita incomes fall below the viability limit. A common consequence is a 
dominance hierarchy in which at least a few strong individuals retain access to resources. As 
examples of anarchic relationships, Jack mentioned international struggles for control of the 
globe's resources, gang warfare in prohibition-era Chicago, miners versus claim jumpers in the 
California gold rush, animal territoriality, and male elephant seals who fight to sequester “harems” 
of females.the ratio form of the contest success function the decisiveness parameter is the exponent to which each effort is
When the exponent is zero, efforts are irrelevant and distribution is egalitarian. When the exponent is one,
tion is proportional to effort. When the exponent is infinite, winner takes all.
In the course of theorizing about conflict (Hirshleifer, 1995b), Jack summarized some of his 
conclusions and sketched a model of armed settlement under threat. In the same book, 
McGuire (1995) discussed defense economics and international security. Jack had earlier been 
influenced by Martin McGuire's research10 on the accumulation of strategic weapons and 
secrecy (McGuire, 1965), and the structure of choice between deterrence and defense 
(McGuire, 1967).11 In his macrotechnology of conflict (Hirshleifer, 2000), Jack drew the 
connection between the Lanchester (1916) model of warfare, where differential equations 
account for attrition rates of military forces, and the ratio form of the contest success function. 
The kill probabilities correspond to the unit battle effectiveness parameters and the initial force 
sizes to the committed fighting efforts. Lanchester's square law is somewhat analogous to the 
decisiveness parameter. In ancient linear war, squaring would not hold, so numerical 
superiority would be less decisive. Even for warfare as modern as the so-called Ardennes 
Campaign toward the end of World War II, Hausken and Moxnes (2005) find empirical 
support for linear rather than square war, which suggests low decisiveness. The deterministic 
Lanchester equations are limited such that the stronger side ultimately wipes out the weaker. 
Hence, there is no way to scale degree of success. Neither Jack's approach to conflict nor the 
stochastic Lanchester equations have this limitation.12
Jack usually did not distinguish between offense and defense. This has been a common 
approach, taken also by Neary (1997), Skaperdas (1992), Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1997), 
and others.13 Jack did distinguish between an offensive and defensive contest success function 
in his macrotechnology of conflict (Hirshleifer, 2000), and illustrated the distinction with 
historical examples. Jack was of course acutely aware that war theorists such as Clausewitz 
(1832) made the distinction quite elaborately, and history is full of examples illustrating the 
need to make the distinction. Jack illustrated how geography, organization, truth, and morality 
can be accounted for in production and conflict models. Expanding on this latter insight, 
Hirshleifer and Osborne (2001) developed a Litigation Success Function for lawsuits. A truth 
ratio reflects the true degree of fault by the Defendant, multiplied by the ratio of litigation 
efforts by the two sides raised to the decisiveness parameter. When the parameter is zero or 
the two sides invest equal efforts, legal efforts are ineffective compared to the power of truth, 
i.e. the underlying merits of the case. Applying the Nash–Cournot and Stackelberg protocols, 
they determined equilibrium litigation efforts, proportionate success, and the values of the 
lawsuit on each side. Outcomes were evaluated in terms of achieving ‘justice’, interpreted as 
equality between Defendant fault and relative Plaintiff success, and minimizing aggregate 
litigation cost.
With the period prior to World War II in mind, Jack asked whether appeasement could 
be successful (Hirshleifer, 2001a). He set up the four payoff matrices dependent on whether10 Jack's pleasant attitude to diversity was expressed in his relationship with Martin, an Irish Catholic. They agreed after
meeting that Jack would consider Martin an ‘honorary Jew,’ while Martin would consider Jack an ‘honorary Catholic’.
11 See also Anderton (2003) on historical contributions and future possibilities for economic theorizing about conflict. 
12 Reuveny and Maxwell (2001) and my paper (Hausken, 2005) are other examples of dynamic production and conflict 
models.
13 The late Herschel Grossman adopted a focus on property rights and distinguished between common-pool and initial-
claims models. As an example, Grossman and Kim (1995) showed that, with defensive investment before appropriation, 
a sufficiently large defensive advantage causes initial possession to remain unchallenged. In Hausken (2004) I 
distinguished between the offense and defense to enable exchange to emerge, and Anderton et al. (1999) distinguished 
between one attacker and one defender in an exchange model.
Germany was peace-loving, aggressive, appeasable, or bluffing, considering payoffs as a 
compound of preferences, opportunities, and perceptions. He reasoned that the Western 
leaders failed to appreciate that Hitler, incorrectly, perceived that Germany would succeed. 
Had the Western leaders acknowledged Hitler's perception, appeasement was an error, since 
it served to strengthen Germany's aggressive strategy. Jack presented various conditions for 
appeasement to be effective, and postulated a proposition: “If the opponent's preferences are 
hostile and non-appeasable, the best strategy is to keep her so poor that she cannot afford 
to engage in deprivation. If the opponent is hostile but appeasable, the best strategy is to 
make her so affluent that she will no longer desire to exercise her deprivation option.” In 
his 2001 book (Hirshleifer, 2001c), The Dark Side of the Force, Jack reprinted 14 of his 
articles on conflict, adding a brief background for each chapter, an introduction, and 
indices.14
7. Biology
Jack's focus on biology developed from the late 1970s and can be divided into four categories.
7.1. Economics, biology, psychology, and physiology
Jack's rationality paradigm, incorporating biology, led into psychology, physiology, and 
ancient moral philosophy. First came the emotions as guarantors of threats and promises 
(Hirshleifer, 1987e), with regard to which Jack took an economic and game theoretic 
approach. This was one of the first attempts in the economics literature to deal systematically 
with the “non-rational” phenomenon represented by human emotions, and was presented in 
1985 at a Stanford University conference on evolution and information. Despite violating 
rationality, Jack claimed that emotions such as anger, gratitude, benevolence, malevolence, and 
spite, have been evolutionarily selected because they facilitate eliciting cooperation from the 
targeted parties. Jack's theory of emotions as commitment subsequently entered the 
evolutionary psychology literature. Frank (1988) developed similar ideas focusing on passions 
within reason. Guttman et al. (1992) considered social investment in taste change related to 
rent seeking,15 and Hausken (1996) showed how agents may maximize a weighted sum of the 
utility to self and others.
Jack thereafter published the economic logic of the affections and the passions (Hirshleifer, 
1993a). Jack's rational approach to bioeconomics implied a certain reserve and skepticism toward14 We can compare the combined focus of Jack Hirshleifer and Herschel I. Grossman (who died October 9, 2004). They 
had in common an early focus within one core field of economics, and subsequently moved on to political economy, 
contest theory, and conflict. Herschel's early focus was Keynesian macroeconomics, while Jack's early focus was 
information economics, which involved investment and capital theory also related to macroeconomics. After 
contributions on credibility, time consistency, and reputation, Herschel reasoned that neoclassical economics could not 
explain in a straightforward way the connection between monetary and real variables. Eventually identifying the political 
system as the key influence on frictions in the economy, he reasoned that the survival probability of a regime depends on 
how the ruling elite discounts the future. That led him to analyze the role of the state, property rights, the technological 
factors of regime change, and the conflict of distribution (Grossman, 2004; Kolmar, 2005). In Jack's case the link from 
information economics to conflict is less obvious, but his early research solidified his acquaintance with economic tools 
such as general equilibrium analysis, which played a role also in his later research.
15 Guttman (2000, 2003) has more recently applied the evolutionary approach to analyze endogenous preference 
formation.
the anti-rationalist behaviorism proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979).16 He thought that 
many of the experimental results could be interpreted in rational terms. Elster (1998), expressing 
reluctance to believe that norms in all respects are reducible to maximizing behavior, presented 
discussions and criticisms of the evolutionary approach, and provided a general analysis of 
research on emotions by economists and non-economists. After the mid-19th when Spencer 
(1851) and others expounded the link between biology and the social sciences, the two 
professions drifted apart. The cleavage was especially prominent in the 1920s. Both proponents 
and opponents of unity versus disunity of science have over the last half-century observed a 
variety of ways in which biology and the social sciences coalesce. Historical traditions, vested 
interests, and scientific progress, will likely prevent the union from returning to the close 
relationship of the mid-19th century. In a paper not particularly related to his other works, but 
related to psychology in the sense of focusing on learning and autonomy, Hirshleifer and 
Kourilsky (1976), compared experimentally the effects on learning and autonomy of socially 
emergent and imposed behavior modification. He also published an article on the game-theoretic 
interpretations of commitment (Hirshleifer, 2001b).
Jack was on the editorial board of the Journal of Bioeconomics between 1999 and 2005 where 
he cooperated, among others, with Paul Zak, whom he introduced as “the first professor of 
neuroeconomics.” Together they investigated the bioeconomics of social behavior (Hirshleifer 
and Zak, 2004). Subsequently Paul Zak participated in a study of the biological basis of trust 
(Kosfeld et al., 2005).
7.2. Which strategies are optimal in evolutionary equilibrium models?
The 1980s witnessed an increased interest in evolution and game theory, for example by 
Maynard Smith (1982), and Axelrod (1984) on tit-for-tat. Jack at the same time published an 
article on evolutionary models in economics and law with a focus on cooperation versus conflict 
strategies (Hirshleifer, 1982). Thereafter he published three papers applying replicator dynamics 
to account for the time dimension to analyze the strategies that are optimal in evolutionary 
equilibrium models. First, Hirshleifer and Martinez-Coll (1988) showed for the Prisoner's 
Dilemma that the tit-for-tat strategy is not robustly successful if there is a cost of complexity or 
probability of error, or there is an elimination contest rather than a round-robin tournament. They 
showed that evolutionary competition typically generates an interior equilibrium where more and 
less cooperative strategies simultaneously coexist. Second, Martinez-Coll and Hirshleifer (1991) 
found similar results for both the Prisoner's Dilemma and Chicken when the four strategies 
cooperate, defect, tit-for-tat, and bully, are simultaneously present. Third, Hirshleifer and 
Martinez-Coll (1992) demonstrated the preservation of diversity accounting more thoroughly for 
selection and mutation.
Jack's last paper in this category is his demonstration that there are many evolutionary 
pathways to cooperation (Hirshleifer, 1999). Considering the Prisoner's Dilemma, Chicken, and 
Tender Trap, and allowing the two protocols of single-round simultaneous move and single-round 
sequential move, Jack first demonstrated the roles of kinship and reciprocity. Thereafter he 
showed that once payoff modifications and/or more elaborate protocols are allowed, other 
pathways such as punishment options, complementary strategy mixes, recognition effects, 
coordination using external clues, and group selection may underlie cooperation.16 They determined empirically a utility function that is concave for gains, convex for losses, steeper for losses than for
gains, overweighting low probabilities.
7.3. The bioeconomic causes of warHaving distinguished the natural economy from political economy (Hirshleifer, 1978b), and 
spontaneous order and market economics (Hirshleifer, 1984), Jack proceeded to the bioeconomic 
causes of war (Hirshleifer, 1998). He began by observing that in biological terms the ultimate 
functional motives for fighting are food and sex, the essential elements of reproductive success. 
Like other animals, humans seek food and sex directly and also indirectly via dominance and 
prestige. The direct food and sex motives for warfare have waned in modern times. However, 
although largely disconnected from reproductive success, intangible goals such as prestige, 
dominance, and respect–amplified by the ‘affiliative instinct’–remain with us as continuing 
causes of war. In his conventional style, Jack added to his economic analysis World War I 1914 
quotes from the British Sir Edward Grey and the German Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg, as 
well as from Genghis Khan.
7.4. The truthful signaling hypothesis
Continuing to be influenced by paradoxes outside economics that can be analyzed with 
economic tools, Jack turned his attention to the Truthful Signaling Hypothesis (TSH), sometimes 
known as the handicap principle (e.g. the peacock's tail), which asserts that in mating competition 
higher-quality males signal while lower-quality males signal less or not at all, and the signals are 
believed by females. Developing a general equilibrium model, in contrast to the common partial 
equilibrium models within the economics signaling literature, in our joint research (Hausken and 
Hirshleifer, 2004) we applied a Mating Success Function, a congestion function, and a Malthusian 
condition, and showed that, for TSH equilibria, it is not strictly necessary that the high-quality 
males have an advantage in terms of lower per-unit signaling costs, but a cost difference in favor 
of the low-quality males cannot be too great if a TSH equilibrium is to persist. And, although the 
literature has paid less attention to these points, TSH equilibria may also fail if: the quality 
disparity among males is too great, or the proportion of high-quality males in the population is too 
large, or if the congestion effect is too weak. Signaling being unprofitable in aggregate, it can take 
off from a no-signaling equilibrium only if the trait used for signaling is not initially a handicap 
but instead is functionally useful at low levels. Selection for this trait sets in motion a bandwagon, 
whereby the initially useful indicator is pushed by male–male competition into the domain where 
it does indeed become a handicap.
8. Final observations
Jack Hirshleifer was a political economist who analyzed traditional and non-traditional issues
in innovative ways. He has left a heritage of original ideas and contributions on which to build. He
will in particular remain known for his contributions to information economics, public goods, the
understanding of conflict, and bioeconomics. Had I been choosing, Jack Hirshleifer would have
been a Nobel laureate.
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